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(Record pp.

I.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated.

II.
1.
enter

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Did the District Court commit error in failing to

judgment

as a matter

of law in favor

of the

defendants/appellants Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and Will
McCoy ("McCoy") based upon their post-trial contention that
they conveyed only truthful information?
Standard of Review;

No deference is given to the

trial court's view of the lawf but the appellate court
reviews it for correctness.

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt

Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist, 773, P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989) .
2.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff/appellee,

John

P. Pratt

("Pratt"),

was the

evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that
Prodata

and McCoy

acted

for an

improper

purpose in

interfering with Pratt's economic relations with the Utah
Department of Transportation ("UDOT")?

(Special Verdict

Question No. 2.)
Standard of Review:
viewed

Sufficiency of the evidence when

in the light most

favorable to the party who

prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

- 1-

3.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt,

was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding
that Prodata's and McCoy's intentional interference with
Pratt's economic relations with UDOT proximately caused an
injury to Pratt?

(Special Verdict Question No. 4.)

Standard of Review:
viewed

Sufficiency of the evidence when

in the light most

favorable to the party who

prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).
4.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt,

was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding
that Prodata and McCoy were not privileged to interfere
with

Pratt's

economic

relations with UDOT?

(Special

Verdict Question No. 5.)
Standard of Review:
viewed

in the

Sufficiency of the evidence when

light most

favorable to the party who

prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).
5.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt,

was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding
that Pratt did not recognize the risk of harm to himself by
reason of the actions of Prodata and McCoy and thereafter
intentionally
interests?

or

heedlessly

to

protect

his

own

(Special Verdict Question No. 6.)

Standard of Review:
viewed

fail

Sufficiency of the evidence when

in the light most

favorable to the party who

prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

- 2 -

6.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt,

was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding
that Prodata suffered no actual damages by reason of
Pratt's breach of the noncompetition clause in the Employee
Agreement?

(Special Verdict Question No. 10.)

Standard of Review;
viewed

Sufficiency of the evidence when

in the light most

favorable to the party who

prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14f 17 (Utah 1988).

III.
There

is

no

DETERMINATIVE LAW

constitutional

provision,

statute,

ordinance, rule, or regulation whose interpretation is
determinative of the issues on this appeal.

IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The

brought

plaintiff/appellee,
this

action

John

against

the

P.

Pratt

("Pratt"),

defendants/appellants

Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and Will McCoy

("McCoy") for

intentional interference with Pratt's economic relations
with the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). Pratt
also requested a declaratory judgment (1) that a 1985 "NonDisclosure/Non-Competitive Employment Agreement" between
Pratt and Prodata (the "Employee Agreement") was modified
and/or superseded by a subsequent "Type 3 - Independent
Contractor Services Subcontract Services Agreement" between
- 3-

the same parties (the "Subcontractor Agreement"), and (2)
that he had not violated his contractual obligations under
either of these agreements.

(R. 2-13 and 45-61)x

Prodata and McCoy denied that they had interfered with
Pratt's economic relations and also set forth several
affirmative defenses to Pratt's claims, including that they
were privileged to act as they did and that Pratt himself
had been the cause of his own injury.

Prodata also

asserted a counterclaim against Pratt, alleging that Pratt
had breached the non-compete provisions of the Employee
Agreement and requesting an award of $25,000 in liquidated
damages.

(R. 90-104.)

Pratt denied that he had any

liability under the Employee Agreement and alleged by way
of

affirmative

defense

that

such

agreement

had

been

modified and/or superseded by the subsequent Subcontractor
Agreement.

(R. 69-74.)2

X

A11 references to the original record are in the form
"R." followed by the page numbers. Similarly, references
to the Reporter's transcript are in the form "T." followed
by the page numbers. Trial Exhibits are referred to as
"Ex." followed by the Exhibit number. Materials included
in an Addendum to this brief are, in addition, identified
as "Addendum" followed by the Addendum number.
2

Prodata's and McCoy's affirmative defenses of
privilege and causation, together with Prodata's request
for liquidated damages, were first asserted in a "Proposed
Amended Answer and Counterclaim" filed on August 24, 1990.
(R. 90-104.)
Although filed pursuant to a Stipulation
between the parties (R. 88-89), this amended pleading was
never served upon Pratt, and Pratt never filed an amended
Reply thereto. Nevertheless, the new issues raised by the
amended pleading, as well as Pratt's additional defenses
thereto (including Pratt's affirmative assertion that he
was not liable for the specified liquidated damages), were
- 4 -

B.

Course of Proceedings
This case was tried to a jury on March 19-21, 1991.

(R. 836.)

The District Court directed a verdict in favor

of Prodata and McCoy as to Pratt's claim for declaratory
relief.

(T. 405-06, R. 756-58.)

The jury thereafter

returned a Special Verdict in favor of Pratt both on
Pratt's interference claim and on Prodata's counterclaim.
(R. 700-04; Addendum l.)3

deemed to have been properly and timely asserted.
e.g., R. 733 and 745.)
3

(See,

Just prior to trial, the District Court ruled that
Pratt's proof of the "improper means" element in connection
with his interference claim required proof of "each of the
relevant elements of an independent tort by the standard
of proof applicable to that tort under Utah law." (R. 53839.) It is submitted that this ruling is directly contrary
to the Oregon rule which was expressly adopted by this
Court. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
304 (Utah 1982) (Oregon definition expressly adopted); Top
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201,
582 P.2d 1365, 1371 n. 11 (1978) (proof of all elements of
liability for another tort is not necessary)• Then, prior
to instructing the jury, the District Court ruled that the
only independent tort which had been adequately alleged by
Pratt
in his pleadings was that
of
intentional
misrepresentation. (T. 405-08, R. 756-58.) The District
Court accordingly instructed the jury that they could only
find that Prodata and McCoy used "improper means" if they
found that Pratt had proven certain elements of the
independent tort of intentional misrepresentation by clear
and convincing evidence. (R. 727-32; Addendum 11.) Pratt
maintains that these rulings were clearly erroneous and
improperly increased his burden of proof in this case. (T.
408-09, R. 527-35.) Should this Court decide that further
trial court proceedings are required in this case,
therefore, appropriate clarification of these central
issues is respectfully requested.
- 5 -

c

*

Disposition in the District Court
In accordance with the jury's verdict, Judgment was

entered in favor of Pratt on March 27, 1991.

(R. 759-60.)

Prodata and McCoy moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial.
67.)

(R. 765-

Their motion was denied by the District Court (R.

824-26), and Prodata and McCoy filed this appeal.

(R. 827-

28.)
D.

Statement of the Facts
Pratt is a computer consultant with over fifteen years

of experience.

(T. 1 and 13-14.)

During that time, Pratt

has become acquainted with some of the data processing
personnel

who

now

work

for

the

Transportation ("UDOT") (T. 23),
highly regarded by them.

Utah

Department

of

and Pratt's skills are

(T. 328.)

In September of 1985, Pratt became employed by Prodata
to provide

data

processing

services.

(T. 14.)

In

connection with this employment, Pratt signed an "Employee
Non-Disclosure/Non-Competitive Employment Agreement" (the
"Employee Agreement").
things,

the

Employee

(T. 14-15, Ex. 11.)
Agreement

prohibited

Among other
Pratt

from

forming or otherwise participating in a competing business
within 50 miles of Salt Lake City for one year following
the termination of his employment.

(Ex. 11, paragraph 9.)

By written notice to Prodata, Pratt terminated the
Employee

Agreement

effective May
- 6 -

1,

1988,

(T. 15.)

Nevertheless, Prodata wanted Pratt's continued work on a
project for the Utah Department of Employment Security
("UDES").
-

Therefore, Prodata thereafter signed a "Type 3

Independent

Contractor Services Subcontract

Services

Agreement" with Pratt (the "Subcontractor Agreement") to
obtain Pratt's continuing services.

(T. 16-19.)

The

Subcontractor Agreement did not require Pratt to work
exclusively for Prodata and did not guarantee Pratt full
time

work.

Rather,

the

Subcontractor

Agreement

acknowledged and engaged Pratt as an independent business
providing competing services. The Subcontractor Agreement
did, however, prohibit Pratt, for a period of six months
after the termination of the Subcontractor Agreement, from
competing with Prodata at the specific clients which were
serviced by Pratt under the Agreement.

(T. 22-23 and 167,

Ex. 14.)
In engaging Pratt under the Subcontractor Agreement,
Prodata required Pratt to operate as a competing business,
something which would otherwise have violated the Employee
Agreement.

(T. 19-20.)

Pratt accordingly believed that

the Subcontractor Agreement

superseded his non-compete

obligations under the Employee Agreement. (T. 20.)4
Pratt terminated his Subcontractor Agreement with
Prodata effective March 29, 1989.

4

(T. 21-22, Ex. 26.)

See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Burninqham, 671 P.2d 196 (Utah
1983) .
- 7 -

Pratt was asked by UDOT personnel to do some contract work
at UDOT.

(T. 23.)

Pratt agreed and commenced providing

services to UDOT on or about February 27, 1989.
24.)

(T. 23-

While engaged by Prodata under the Subcontractor

Agreement, Pratt performed work exclusively for UDES.

(T.

20-21.)

The

He performed no work for UDOT.

(T. 23.)

parties accordingly agree that Pratt did not violate his
Subcontractor Agreement by subsequently providing services
to UDOT.

(T. 22-23 and 129-30.)

Pratt's departure from Prodata had no adverse effect
upon the continuing work being done by Prodata at UDES.
(T. 206.)

Likewise, Pratt's subsequent work at UDOT did

not hinder Prodata from performing work for UDOT during the
same time period.

(T. 153-54 and 165-66.)

Nevertheless,

McCoy, who was then Prodata's City Manager for Salt Lake
City, was very unhappy with Pratt for leaving Prodata.
(T. 193-94.) McCoy even told at least one Prodata employee
to stay away from Pratt and openly accused Pratt of bad or
unethical conduct (T. 202), although McCoy admits he knew
of nothing bad Pratt had done.

(T. 170.)

During the summer of 1989, McCoy carefully reviewed
Pratt's agreements with Prodata.

As a result, McCoy

concluded that Pratt had not violated his agreements.
134-36.)

(T.

In fact, McCoy admits that he did not become

aware of any basis for asserting a contract violation on
the part of Pratt until September 26, 1989.
- 8 -

(T. 136-40.)

Nevertheless, as early as June of 1989, McCoy referred to
Pratt as having taken contract work away from Prodata, and
McCoy openly stated that Prodata was going to "make an
example" of Pratt.

(T. 122-23.)

In September of 1989, McCoy and Prodata learned that
another former Prodata employee, Ron Hartle ("Hartle"), was
providing services to UDOT.

McCoy and Prodata believed

that Hartle was in breach of his non-compete agreement with
Prodata by so doing.

Prodata's President, Bill Basham

("Basham"), told Hartle that Prodata would get Hartle out
of UDOT using "whatever means he could."

(T. 285-86.)

McCoy had previously been employed as the Comptroller
for UDOT.
67.)

(T. 127.) He knew the UDOT personnel.

(T. 166-

Treating Hartle and Pratt as a package (T. 152),

McCoy met with UDOT officials on several occasions to
discuss Hartle and Pratt.

(T. 137-50.)

At McCoy's

request, UDOT conducted "an investigation" into the alleged
non-compete violations using information supplied by McCoy.
(T. 370-75.)

UDOT ultimately consummated

a "business

arrangement" with McCoy to "clear up the matter."

(T. 278-

79.)
On October 2, 1989, the next business day, Pratt was
summoned to the office of Neal Christensen, UDOT's Director
of Administrative Services.

Pratt was told that he was

being terminated by UDOT effective immediately.

(T. 2.)

When he asked the reason, Pratt was told that he was being
- 9 -

terminated because of a conflict with Prodata and that he
would not be considered for further work at UDOT until his
differences with Prodata were resolved,

(T. 3.)

Pratt was totally surprised by UDOT's termination of
his contract. He was not aware of any conflict he had with
Prodata.

(T. 3, 39-40.)

In an effort to resolve the

matter, Pratt arranged to meet with McCoy.

McCoy told

Pratt that he would clear Pratt for further work at UDOT if
Pratt

paid

Prodata

approximately

$4,000.

Pratt

was

shocked; he did not believe he owed Prodata anything and
regarded the request as extortionate*

(T. 4 and 65.)

After Pratt left this meeting, McCoy was visibly pleased
that Pratt would have to pay Prodata.

(T. 120.)

Pratt subsequently tried to resolve the matter with
UDOT.

Although UDOT personnel had freely met with and

listened to McCoy, UDOT personnel would not listen to
Pratt.

(T. 4-13.)

The sudden termination of Pratt's

contract with UDOT left Pratt without work for several
weeks.

(T. 40-41 and 84-85.)

Pratt ultimately succeeded

in obtaining other work; however, Pratt was not permitted
to do further work for UDOT.

(T. 42-43.)

Pratt finally

commenced this civil action in an effort to resolve the
matter.

(T. 13.)

- 10 -

V.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Prattfs Interference Claim
1.

Improper Purpose and Privilege

McCoy expressed groundless displeasure toward and
criticism of Pratt over a period of several months. McCoy
accused Pratt of taking contract work from Prodata and
threatened to "make an example" of him many months before
McCoy admittedly had any information which suggested to him
that Pratt had done anything whatsoever improper.

Neither

Prodata nor McCoy ever approached Pratt about any alleged
violation of his contract.

Instead, they were intent on

simply getting Pratt (with Hartle) out of UDOT no matter
what it took.

It was clearly an afterthought to use

Pratt's alleged earlier violation of his then-expired noncompete

obligation

as

a

business

justification

for

interfering with Pratt's ongoing contract work for UDOT.
2.

Causation

After Prodata and McCoy had intentionally interfered
with Pratt's contract with UDOT, Pratt did all he could to
resolve the matter with both Prodata and UDOT. Prodata and
McCoy were ostensibly willing to clear Pratt for further
work at UDOT if Pratt would only pay them money. However,
Pratt did not believe he owed Prodata any money.

Pratt

certainly did not himself become a cause of the resulting
injury to him simply because he would not make a requested

- 11 -

payment to Prodata, the party whose intentional conduct had
caused the injury in the first place.
3.

Truthful Communication

In view of their improper purpose in interfering with
Pratt's contract with UDOT, Prodata and McCoy cannot avoid
liability for their intentional interference simply because
the means they purportedly employed

(i.e., transmitting

only truthful information) was allegedly proper. Moreover,
there was no finding by the jury that Prodata and McCoy
actually communicated "only truthful information to UDOT."
In fact, this new defense was never raised before trial at
all and is not properly before the Court on this appeal.
B.

Prodatafs Counterclaim
There was substantial evidence to support the jury's

finding that Prodata suffered no damages by reason of
Pratt's alleged

breach of his non-compete

obligation.

There was also substantial evidence that any actual damages
suffered

by

Prodata

were

de

minimis

and

grossly

disproportionate to the specified liquidated damages.

VI.

ARGUMENT

This Court has repeatedly "pointed out the importance
of affording parties who desire it a trial by jury; and
that the courts should exercise caution and reluctance in
interfering with them."

Schow v. Guardtone, Inc.. 18 Utah

2d 135, 417 P.2d 643, 646 (1966). Prodata and McCoy assert
- 12 -

no basis which would justify disturbing the juryfs verdict
in this case.
A.

The District Court's Judgment on Pratt's Interference
Claim Should Be Affirmed,
It is well established that a defendant is liable

under

Utah

law

for

intentional

interference

with

prospective economic relations if it is proven "(1) that
the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's
existing

or potential

economic

relations,

(2) for an

improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury
to the plaintiff."

Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,

657 P.2d 293, 304

(Utah 1982).

See also, Sampson v.

Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 776 P.2d
916 (Utah 1989).
While a defendant may prove a limited privilege for
his actions by way of affirmative defense, it is likewise
clear that any such privilege is not absolute.

As aptly

noted by the Supreme Court of Oregon, "[e]ven a recognized
privilege may be overcome when the means used by defendant
are

not

justified

privilege."

by

the reason

for

recognizing

the

Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate

Insurance Co.. 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978)
(case cited with approval by this Court in adopting the
Oregon approach to this tort, see Leigh Furniture, supra,
657 P.2d at 304.)

See also. Sloan v. Journal Publishing

Cg^, 213 Or. 324, 324 P.2d 449, 465 (1958) (defense of

- 13 -

privilege rejected, stating: "We find no justification for
coercive tactics by the defendants, the effect of which is
first to invade the exclusive functions of management and
second to destroy profitable contractual rights of third
parties, the plaintiffs.")

Similarly, courts in other

states have declined to recognize a privilege to interfere
with

the

economic

relations

of

another

when

such

interference is motivated by a desire to injure or is
accomplished

by

improper

means.

See,

e.g..

Alyeska

Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service. Inc., 604 P.2d
1090, 1093-94 (Alaska 1979) (the Court also noted that
"[t]he

question

of

justification

for

invading

the

contractual interest of another is normally one for the
trier

of

fact, particularly

when

the

evidence

is in

conflict"); Buckaloo v. Johnson. 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d
865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975).

See also. Edwards v.

Anaconda Co.. 115 Ariz. 313, 565 P.2d 190, 193 (Ariz. App.
1977)

("This competitor's privilege does not apply to

inducement of breach of contract but only to interference
with business expectancies.").
!•

There is Substantial Evidence to
Support the Jury's Finding That Prodata
and McCoy Acted for an "Improper
Purpose" and Were Not "Privileged."

Over a period of several months, McCoy expressed
anger,

implied

improper

conduct,

alleged

contractual

violations, and threatened to take action against Pratt,

- 14 -

for which there was admittedly no known factual or legal
basis.

Such conduct evidences ill will and an intent to

injure Pratt for the sake of injury alone, rather than an
intent merely to protect some legitimate business interest.
For example, Mr. Clawson testified that McCoy was
"very unhappy" at Pratt in February of 1989 when Pratt
terminated his Subcontractor Agreement and left Prodata.
(T. 193-94; Addendum 6.)
business

reason

unquestionably

for

entitled

There was clearly no legitimate
this

unhappiness.

Pratt

was

to terminate his Subcontractor

Agreement, and Mr. Read testified that the Prodata project
on which Pratt had been working was not adversely affected
at all.

(T. 206; Addendum 7.)

Similarly, Mr. Read testified that McCoy told him in
April or May of 1989 to "stay away" from Pratt and that
Pratt had done worse things than anything Mr. Read knew
about.

(T. 202; Addendum 7.)

This apparent attempt to

discredit Pratt was likewise not justified by any business
purpose; Defendant McCoy admitted that he knew of nothing
whatsoever Pratt had done which McCoy would consider bad.
(T. 170; Addendum 5.)
Then, according to Mr. Crocker, McCoy referred to
Pratt

in about June of 1989, accusing him of taking

contracts away from Prodata and violating his non-compete
obligation to Prodata, stating that Prodata was going to
"make an example" of Pratt.

(T. 122; Addendum 4.)
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By his

own admission, however, McCoy knew of no factual basis for
claiming a contract violation by Pratt until September 26,
1989.

(T. 135-36; Addendum 5.)

Mr.

Hartle

testified

that

Prodata

and

McCoy

specifically told him they were going to get him out of
UDOT by "whatever means [they] could."
9.)

(T. 286; Addendum

From the defendants' admitted package treatment of Mr.

Hartle and Pratt (T. 152; Addendum 5), therefore, it could
reasonably be inferred that Prodata and McCoy had the same
intent with respect to Pratt.

In addition, Pratt met with

McCoy after Pratt's contract at UDOT was terminated (T. 4;
Addendum 2) ; and, according to Mr. Crocker, McCoy was
visibly pleased after meeting with Pratt and announcing
that Pratt would have to pay Prodata money.

(T. 120;

Addendum 4.)
Further, although McCoy repeatedly met with and told
others that he thought Pratt had violated his contract with
Prodata, Prodata and McCoy admittedly never contacted Pratt
about any alleged contract violation.
5.)

(T. 130; Addendum

Instead, as Mr. Charles Christensen testified, McCoy

said he made a "business arrangement" with UDOT to "clear
up the matter."

(T. 279; Addendum 8.)

Other than this

lawsuit, the only contact between Pratt and Prodata and
McCoy concerning the alleged "problem" was initiated by
Pratt. (T. 39-40; Addendum 2.)

- 16 -

Thus, although Prodata and McCoy claim that they were
merely

pursuing

a

legitimate

business

and

economic

objective of enforcing their employee and subcontractor
agreements, there is substantial evidence that this alleged
objective was in reality an afterthought.

Much of the

conduct of Prodata and McCoy referred to above admittedly
took place before Prodata and McCoy were aware of any need
to pursue their claimed objective, and any such objective
cannot, therefore, justify such conduct. Rather, Prodatafs
and McCoy's conduct leads one to the inescapable conclusion
that Prodata and McCoy harbored ill feelings towards Pratt
and were intent on injuring and "making an example" of him
without any regard to whether there was a legitimate basis
for their action.
Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, this Court in Leigh
Furniture aptly explained:
[I]f one does not act in a good faith attempt to
protect his own interest or that of another but,
rather, is motivated by a desire to injure the
contract party, he forfeits the immunity afforded
by the privilege. . . . In the case at bar, the
central factual issue . . . was whether Alyeska
was genuinely furthering its own economic and
safety interests or was using them as a facade
for inflicting injury upon Aurora. There was
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could
properly find that Alyeska was acting out of ill
will towards Aurora, rather than to protect a
legitimate business interest.
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 308
(Utah 1982) (Emphasis in original; quoting Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc., 604 P.2d 1090,
- 17 -

1094

(Alaska 1979)).

Likewise in this case, there is

clearly substantial evidence to support the jury's finding
that Prodata and McCoy acted for an "improper purpose" and
were not "privileged."
2.

There is Substantial Evidence to Support the
Jury's Finding That the Conduct of Prodata and
McCoy Proximately Caused an Injury to Pratt.

It is undisputed that UDOT based its decision to
terminate Pratt's contract solely upon information provided
by Prodata and McCoy.
UDOT's

Director,

Mr.

(T. 370-75; Addendum 10.) Moreover,
Findlay,

testified

that

Pratt's

contract with UDOT would not have been terminated if it had
not

been

Prodata.

for the

alleged

conflict

between

Pratt and

(T. 102; Addendum 3.)

In addition, UDOT officials had several meetings with
McCoy prior to terminating Pratt's contract, and they also
reported the termination to Prodata and McCoy afterwards.
(T. 137-50; Addendum 5.)

UDOT obviously wanted input from

Prodata and McCoy and believed they had an interest in the
matter.

At the same time, it is undisputed that Pratt was

neither informed nor asked about the proposed contract
termination before it became effective.
2.)

(T. 3; Addendum

There can be no doubt that Pratt's contract with UDOT

would

not have been terminated

absent the conduct of

Prodata and McCoy.
Prodata and McCoy do not challenge the jury's finding
that they intentionally interfered with Pratt's economic
- 18 -

relations with UDOT.

In fact, they now admit that their

conduct actually caused the termination of Pratt's contract
with UDOT.

(Brief of Appellants at p. 29.) Nevertheless,

Prodata and McCoy contend that Pratt is somehow himself the
cause of any damages he suffered because he did not accept
their "offer" of settlement.
It is undisputed that Pratt contacted both UDOT and
McCoy in an effort to resolve this matter.

McCoy demanded

a "settlement" payment from Pratt which he did not believe
he

owed.

Pratt

accordingly

concluded

that

further

discussions with Prodata and McCoy would be unproductive,
and such discussions were likewise not pursued further by
Prodata and McCoy.

Nevertheless, Pratt thereafter tried

for several months to resolve the matter directly with
UDOT.

Only after those efforts failed did Pratt resort to

litigation.

(T. 4-13; Addendum 2.)

Contrary to the assertions of Prodata and McCoy,
therefore, there is absolutely no evidence that Pratt
"intentionally or heedlessly" failed to protect his own
interests.

On the contrary, there is substantial, if not

uncontroverted, evidence that Pratt undertook reasonable
efforts to remedy the termination of his contract at UDOT
and thereafter initiated litigation only when those efforts
failed.

- 19 -

3*

The Alleged Transmission of Only Truthful
Information Does Not Relieve Prodata and McCoy
From Liability in This Case,

Prodata and McCoy urge that they are immune from
liability

for

intentional

interference

with

Pratt's

economic relations because they transmitted only truthful
information.

This contention must, however, fail for at

least three reasons.
First, Prodata and McCoy apparently assert that their
allegedly

"proper

means"

(transmitting

truthful

information) cures any "improper purpose." Such a position
is, however, contrary to established Utah law.

As this

Court has clearly explained,
The alternative of improper purpose (or
motive, intent, or objective) will support a
cause of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations even where the
defendant's means were proper.
Leiah

Furniture,

supplied).

supra,

657

P. 2d

at

307

(Emphasis

It is accordingly submitted that the argument

of Prodata and McCoy confuses the "improper means" and
"improper purpose" alternatives.

The jury having found

that Prodata and McCoy had an "improper purpose," the
alleged propriety of their "means" (transmitting truthful
information) is wholly irrelevant.
Second, the jury did not make the necessary factual
finding to support this contention of Prodata and McCoy.
The jury was asked to determine whether Pratt had proven by
clear

and

convincing

evidence
- 20 -

that

Prodata

and McCoy

knowingly made a false statement of fact to UDOT.
04 and 727-32; Addenda 1 and 11.)

(R. 700-

The jury's negative

finding on that issue, however, does not equate to the
asserted

affirmative

finding

that

Prodata

and

McCoy

conveyed "only truthful information." That issue was never
submitted to the jury for determination.
Finally, the arguments made to the District Court
suggest that Prodata and McCoy regard "truthfulness" as a
new affirmative defense.

(R. 811-14.)

To the extent this

is so, such a defense was neither raised by the pleadings
nor urged as a basis for instructing the jury.

It is

respectfully submitted, therefore, that any such defense
has been waived and is not properly before this Court on
appeal.
B.

See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) and 51.

There is Substantial Evidence to Support the Judgment
in Pratt's Favor on the Counterclaim.
Even assuming that Pratt performed services at UDOT

for approximately two months during which he was obligated
not to compete with Prodata, Pratt is not liable for
liquidated damages if: (1) Prodata suffered no actual
damages

or

(2) the

specified

liquidated

excessive in view of the actual damages.

damages

are

Young Electric

Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164
(Utah 1988).

There is sufficient evidence to justify the

District Court's Judgment on either of these grounds.

- 21 -

For example, Mr. Read testified that the project on
which Pratt was working before he left Prodata in February
of 1989 was not adversely affected at all by Pratt's
departure.

(T. 202; Addendum 7.)

There was, therefore,

direct evidence that Prodata suffered no actual damages.
Pratt testified that his services were specifically
requested by UDOT personnel who had known Pratt before he
became associated with Prodata.

(T. 23; Addendum 2.)

In

addition, during the same time Pratt performed work for
UDOT, Prodata continued its contract work at UDOT unabated,
even after Pratt's contract work at UDOT was terminated.
(T. 165-66; Addendum 5.)

Thus, the evidence also directly

refutes any inference that Pratt traded upon Prodata's name
or goodwill in obtaining his contract at UDOT or that
Prodata otherwise suffered any injury to its goodwill or
reputation as a result of Pratt's work.
Further, while there is no evidence that Prodata would
have actually performed Pratt's 1989 contract work at UDOT,
Pratt

offered

evidence

that

Prodata

would

only

have

realized about $2,000 from such contract work done prior to
May of 1989 (the period of time during which Pratt was
allegedly in breach of his non-compete obligation).
82-83; Addendum 2.)

(T.

Thus, there is also evidence that any

actual damages suffered by the defendants were grossly
disproportionate to the requested $2 5,000 in liquidated
damages.
- 22 -

In view of the foregoing, there is clearly substantial
evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendants
suffered no actual damages.

VII. CONCLUSION
Prodata and McCoy have asserted no legitimate basis
which would justify disturbing the jury's verdict and the
District Court's Judgment.

The Judgment of the District

Court should accordingly be affirmed.
DATED this 3 Q — day of September, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,

Berne S. Broadbent
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
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Telephone: (801) 363-1800
Attorney for Appellee

BRO/1016A1.45
- 23 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Berne S. Broadbent, certify that on this ^ O —
day of September, 1991, I served a copy of the attached
upon Eric C, Olson, the counsel

for the defendants/-

appellants in this matter, by mailing it to him by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:
Eric C. Olson, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

JLT>CJU-'-' •• JyL,

3\

Berne S. Broadbent
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-1800
Attorney for Appellee

- 24 -

Tabl

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. PRATT,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CIVIL NO.

Plaintiffs,

900902742 CV

vs.
PRODATA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

We, the jury, now answer the following questions as our
verdict in this case:
1.

Did the defendants intentionally

plaintiff's

economic

relations with

interfere with the

the Utah

Department

of

Transportation?
ANSWER:

Yes )C

No

If your answer to question 1 is NO, do not answer questions
2 through 7, and proceed directly to question 8.

2.

Did the defendants act for an

improper purpose in

interfering with the plaintiff's economic relations with the
Utah Department of Transportation?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

-2-

3#

Ip

determining

improper means

whether

in interfering

the

defendants

employed

with the plaintiff's

economic

relations with the Utah Department of Transportation, please
answer the following:
a%
presently

Did the defendants make a false statement about a
existing

fact

to

the

Utah

Department

of

Transportation?
ANSWER:
b.

Yes

No V

Did the defendants know that the statement was

false or make the statement without sufficient knowledge?
ANSWER:
C.

Did

the

Yes
defendants,

No X
in

making

the

statement,

intend to induce the Utah Department of Transportation to
act in reliance on the statement?

d.

ANSWER:

Yes V

Did

Department

the Utah

No
of

Transportation

act

with justification on the statement?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

If your answer to question 2 and your answer to any of the
four subparts of question 3 i£3t NO, do not answer questions 4
through 7 and proceed directly to question 8.

-3-

4.

Did the defendants' intentional interference with the

plaintiff's

economic

relations

with

the

Utah

Department

of

Transportation proximately cause an injury to the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

If your answer to question 4 is NO, do not answer questions
5 through 7 and proceed directly to question 8.

5.

Were the defendants privileged to interfere with the

plaintiff's

economic

relations

with

the Utah

Department

of

Transportation?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

£££
If your answer to question 5 is **r, do not answer questions
6 and 7 and proceed directly to question 8.
6.

Did

the

plaintiff

recognize

the

risk

of

harm

to

himself by reason of the defendants' actions but thereafter
intentionally or heedlessly fail to protect his own interests?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

£££
If your answer to question 6 is « ,
7 and proceed directly to question 8.

7.

do not answer question

State the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket and

consequential damages caused by the defendants' interference

-4-

with the plaintiff's existing or future economic relations with

8.

Did the defendant

Prodata waive enforcement

of the

noncompetition clause in the Employment Agreement?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If your answer to question 8 is YES, do not answer any
further questions.
Instead, the foreperson should sign the
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court,

9.

Did the defendant Prodata inexcusably delay asserting

the plaintiff's breach

of contract, thereby prejudicing

the

plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

0*3
If your answer to question 9 is tttr, do not answer any
further questions.
Instead, the foreperson should sign the
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court.

10.

Did the defendant

Prodata

suffer actual

damages by

reason of the plaintiff's breach of the noncompetition clause
in the Employment Agreement?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If your answer to question 10 is NO, do not answer any
further questions.
Instead, the foreperson should sign the
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court.

007{;;
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11.

Did there exist a reasonable relationship between the

$25,000 set as liquidated damages in the Employment Agreement
and the actual damages to be contemplated as arising from a
breach at the time that the Employment Agreement was signed?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If your answer to question 11 is NO, do not answer any
further questions.
Instead, the foreperson should sign the
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court.

12.

State

the

defendant

Prodata#s

damages

proximately

caused by the plaintiff's breach of the Employment Agreement.
$

Dated this

Z / day of March, 1991.

Tab 2

1

Mr, Christensen1s office that your contract might be

2

terminated?

3

A

Absolutely none.

4

Q

You had no idea that your contract was even in

5

jeopardy?

6

A

No.

7

Q

At that time did you have an understanding or get

8

an understanding from Mr. Christensen as to why your contract

9

was being terminated?

10

A

A very vague understanding, yes.

11

Q

What was the understanding that you got at that

A

He told me that there were some conflicts between

12
13

time?

14

Pro-Star and me that I needed to resolve prior to continuing

15

my work there.

16 J

Q

And Pro-Star is the Defendant in this case?

17

A

Yes, that's correct.

18

Q

Had Pro-Star ever told you that there was a con-

19

flict between you and them that you needed to worry about?

20

A

Not a word, no.

21

Q

Were you aware of any conflict between you and Pro-

23

A

No.

24

Q

So what did you do then?

25

A

There wasn't much to do.

22

Star?

I left,

Q

Did you try to resolve things with Pro-Star?

A

Yes, I contacted Will McCoy a couple of days later,

asked him if we could have a meeting.
Q

Did you have a meeting?

A

We did.

Q

And during the course of that meeting, was there

some discussion about what would resolve the matter as far as
Pro-Star was concerned?
A

Yes, Pro-Star said that if I'd pay them some money,

they would write a letter to UDOT clearing me.
Q

They'd clear you to get back —

A

Clearing me to get back in, yes.

Q

Did you pay them some money?

A

No, I didn't owe them anything.

Q

Were you able to resolve anything with Pro-Star?

A

I wasn't, no.

Will McCoy told me to talk to his

attorney from then on.
Q

Did you try and do anything else to resolve this?

A

I contacted Mr. Christensen, oh, a half dozen

times, I don't recall, it may have been more than that,
trying to get him to listen to reason on the thing.

He

basically just said until I had a letter from Pro-Star that
he wasn't going to change his position.
Q

Did you feel like he listened to your position?

A

Not at all.

4

1
2

MR. BROADBENT:

Your Honor, may I approach the

witness?

3

THE COURT:

4

Counsel, I note there are numerous exhibits that

5

You may.

have been premarked.

6

MR. BROADBENT: Yes.

7

THE COURT:

8

Will there be objection to any of those

exhibits being received, Counsel, that you anticipate?

9

MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, we've filed with the Court

10

a stipulation which I believe lists 17 exhibits, the first 17

11

numbered under Plaintiff which are admitted as far as the

12

parties are concerned.

13

MR. BROADBENT:

14

THE COURT:

15

That's correct.

Very well, Exhibits 1 through 17 are

thereby admitted by stipulation.

16

MR. BROADBENT:

17

THE COURT:

We need not lay foundation.

MR. OLSON:

I believe further that on all their

18

That's right.
Let's

proceed.

19
20

exhibits the foundational objections have been waived and

21

it's simply a question of relevance, I believe, which is

22

reserved by the parties.

23
24
25

THE COURT:
Q

Very well.

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Mr. Pratt, I've handed you what

has been marked and by stipulation submitted as evidence in

5

this case, as Exhibit No. 8.

Let me just put a copy of this

exhibit so the jury can see what you're looking at.
Do you recognize this document?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Is this a letter that you wrote?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

Would you read, please, the first paragraph of that

letter?
A

Yes.
"In light of our telephone conversation of November

8 in which you stated that UDOT would not reinstate my
contract, I am requesting that you put in writing the circumstances that led to the contract cancellation."
Q

Had you ever, in fact, asked Mr. Christensen to

reinstate your contract at UDOT?
A

Many times.

Q

And had you told him that you had not been able to

resolve anything with Pro-Star?
A

Yes.

Q

And he had, in fact, refused to reinstate your

contract?
A

Yes.

Q

And in the last part of that first sentence you

say, "I am requesting that you put in writing the circumstances that led to the contract cancellation."

6

Had you ever been told what those circumstances
were?
A

Only as I've described, in the very broadest of

terms.
Q

Mr. Pratt, why don't you now read the next para-

graph down to where it says, "Second," just all but the last
sentence of the next paragraph.
A

"The reason for this request is two-fold.

First,

as I mentioned in our previous meetings, there have been
rumors circulating regarding the reasons for contract termination which have caused damage to my reputation as a contractor.

These rumors abound at UDOT and have spread to

other state agencies and possibly to other companies.

A

letter would document the real circumstances leading to the
cancellation of my contract and provide written evidence that
the rumors are incorrect."
Q

Had you personally heard rumors about your contract

cancellation?
A

Yes, I had.
MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, I'd like to make an objec-

tion to the testimony about rumors.

I think that's pretty

much irrelevant.
THE COURT:

Well, Counsel, the witness has already

answered the last question.
MR. OLSON:

Well, my objection will be on the

7

record, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Where you mentioned in your

letter that these rumors had spread to other state
agencies

—

A

Yes?

Q

—

which other agencies had you heard these rumors

at?
MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, I again object to this line

of questioning on rumors in that it's irrelevant to the
claims being made in this action.
THE COURT:

What do you claim for it, Counsel,

Mr. Broadbent?
MR. BROADBENT:

We believe that the rumor evidence

here is relevant to prove intent, to prove the fact that this
had some impact on his ability to get a job outside of UDOT.
THE COURT:

I think the witness can testify as to

what he deems to be damage and/or intent and/or employment
prospects, but the issue of rumors circulating I deem to be
irrelevant.
Q
graph —
A

The objection's sustained.

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Would you read the last para-

or the last sentence of that second paragraph?
Yes.

"Second, the terms of the standard contract

which we both signed required 30 days written notice in order
to cancel the contract."

8

1

Q

Had you received any notice at all?

2

A

No.

3

Q

You hadn't received any written notice?

4

A

Nothing in writing and no notice at all.

5

Q

Go ahead and read on in the letter.

6

A

Okay.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

letter.
Q

"Please address the following issues in your

How did you first learn of the problem?"
Had you ever been told how they first learned of

the problem?
A

Just in that one meeting.

Nc, I hadn't been told

how they learned of it.
Q

That was your meeting with Mr. Christensen that

you've just been talking about?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

And that was just a very vague reference to some

16

disagreements; is that about what you'd been told?

17

A

Yes, yes.

18

Q

Second question.

19

A

"What are the specific allegations Pro-Star made?"

20

Q

Were you aware or had you been told that there were

21

some allegations Pro-Star had made?

22

that question?

23

MR. OLSON:

Is that why you asked

Your Honor, I object to that.

That

24

would be hearsay, I believe, unless there's some more founda-

25

tion laid.

9

MR. BROADBENT:

I think the fact that he's heard

the allegations, your Honor, is important for him seeking to
resolve this with UDOT to try and find out what was the
problem.
THE COURT:

May be important, Counsel, but it

doesn't solve the objection.

The objection as to hearsay is

sustained.
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Okay,

Had you ever been told

about any specific allegations Pro-Star made?
A

Not specifically, no.

Q

What's the third question?

A

"What is the supporting evidence?"

Q

Had you ever been shown any supporting evidence?

A

None at all.

Q

Had you ever seen any evidence that would support

your termination of that contract?
A

No.

Q

Fourth question.

A

"What is UDOT's legal interest in the matter?"

Q

Explain to the jury why you asked that question.

A

The reason I asked that question is that apparently

they perceived there was a problem between me and Pro-Star.
In my mind, that was a problem between the two parties. I
was not understanding why UDOT would jump in, terminate the
contract, and then with me being economically disadvantaged

10

say, "Now, go work it out."
Q

Go ahead and read the last question.

A

"Why was I not allowed to answer the charges?"

Q

Were you, in fact, not allowed to answer those

charges?
A

Never, no.

Q

Were you ever given an opportunity to explain your

position?
A

No.

Q

Go ahead and finish the letter, please, Mr. Pratt.

A

"I am sure you appreciate the emotional and finan-

cial difficulty that the sudden and unexpected cancellation
of my contract with UDOT has caused my family and me over the
past five weeks.

A letter of explanation could help me sort

out this problem and restore my damaged reputation.

I would

appreciate your prompt response."

10 —

Q

Did you ever receive a response to this letter?

A

I did.

Q

I show you what's been previously marked as Exhibit

pardon me, Exhibit 9.

Is this a copy of the response

you received?
A

It is.

Q

Would you read that response?
THE COURT:

Well, Counsel, I can foresee when we

get through with 35 or 36 exhibits, if the witness is going

11

to read them each to us, that we'll be here a considerable
time.
I note for the record that you have an overhead
viewer and screen which I believe all of the jurors have
previously indicated they can see, so the whole purpose, it
seems to me, of having the visual demonstration is to avoid
the necessity of having the witness read to us what the
exhibit says,
MR. BROADBENT:

So long as all the jurors can read

what's on the overhead, I have no problem.
THE COURT:

Are there any members of the jury who

cannot see or read the letter that's on the screen?
There are none, Counsel, so we can dispense with
the reading.
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Let's take just a minute then

and read through that letter.
Mr. Pratt, in the second paragraph of this letter
it indicates that he will give you a formal response to your
request after he returns to the office on November 27. Did
you ever get a formal response?
A

No, I never did.

Q

Did you ever get any response to those five ques-

tions that you've mentioned in your previous letter?
A

No response to those at all.

Q

Did you get any other communication from UDOT?

12

1

A

Yes, I did.

After repeated attempts to try and get

2

something out of them, I was finally sent a letter by Neal

3

Christensen.

4

Q

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 10,

5

and I'll pause for just a moment to allow the jury to review

6

this letter.

7
8

Is this a copy of the next response you got from
UDOT?

9

A

Yes, it is.

10

Q

Were you ever able to resolve the matter with UDOT?

11

A

No.

12

Q

Has your company since done any contract work for

14

A

No.

15

Q

To your knowledge, have there been outside consul-

13

16

UDOT?

tants who have done work at UDOT?

17

A

Yes, several that I know.

18

Q

Did you have any other conversations with

19
20
21

22

Mr. Christensen after you received this letter?
A

I don't recall if I had any conversations.

I mean,

J I had enough to be satisfied that he was not going to accept
anything I said and that his position was firmly fixed.

23

Q

And so what did you do next?

24

A

I came to you.

Q

Let's go back now, Mr. Pratt, and give the jury a

25

13

Q

And that's the language that you were just refer-

ring to where it says that you can't compete with Pro-Star at
the contractor clients that have been serviced by the
subcontractor?
A

That's correct.

Q

And you hadn't done any work for UDOT?

A

No, I had not.

Q

At the time you went to UDOT, did you believe that

that violated any contractual obligation that you had to
Prodata?
A

No, I did not.

Q

How did your company obtain the contract to work at

UDOT?
A

Lorin Sheffield called me and I'm not clear as to

when this was, but sometime in February, and asked if I would
be willing to bid on some work at UDOT.

—

Q

Who was Lorin Sheffield?

A

Lorin Sheffield was one of the programming managers

I don't know his exact title —

out at the Department of

Transportation and a person I've known for approximately 15
years.
Q

Did you know him before you started working for

Pro-Star?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And when did you start working at UDOT?

23

Your friend did it to you f M and I

1

nothing to do with that.

2

presume that he was meaning Ron Hartle.

3

I said, "You mean Ron Hartle?"

4

And he said, "That's your —

"

Something to the

5

effect, "Those are your words, not mine," and I proceeded to

6

explain to him that it was not my understanding that Ron

7

Hartle had done this but that —

8

done it, that Will McCoy specifically had done it, and I

9

asked them what they wanted from me.

excuse me —

Pro-Star had

He said that if I paid

10

him money, that they would clear me at UDOT and I could get

11

back in.

12
13

Q

Were there any other discussions in that meeting

about your contract obligations to Pro-Star?

14

A

Not to my recollection.

15

Q

Okay.

Have you ever believed that you have vio-

16 J lated either of your contracts with Pro-Star?
17

A

No.

18

Q

As you sit here today, do you believe you violated

19

those contracts?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Before you filed this lawsuit, did Pro-Star take

22

any action against you or try and pursue you for any alleged

23

violation of the contract?

24
25

A

Pro-Star did not do one thing, did not say one

word, did not put anything in writing, did not indicate to me
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in any way until after we filed this action tnat they felt
like I'd violated —

well, I take that back.

Until our

meeting they did not indicate in any way to me that they felt
I had violated my contract.
Q

And this is a meeting that occurred when?

A

It occurred several days after I was terminated at

UDOT.
Q

After October 2nd?

A

Yes.

Q

You previously referred to Ron Hartle.

Would you

just explain so the record's clear on that, who is Ron
Hartle?
A

Ron Hartle is a former employee of Prodata.

known Ron for many, many years also.

I've

I've known him for

about 12 or 13 years which predates either our association
with Prodata.

He was working at the Department of Transpor-

tation at the same time I was and we were acquaintances.
Q

At the time your contract with UDOT was terminated,

did your company have other contracts that it was working on?
A

No, we did not at that time.

Q

What did you do after October 2nd with respect to

your work?
A

I started looking for other contracts.

Q

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 27.

I ask you if you recognize that document.
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1

MR. OLSON:

I have nothing further.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

3

MR. BROADBENT:

4
5

Yes.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROADBENT:

6
7

Any redirect?

Q

Mr. Prattf in the Complaint in this action have you

alleged that you are doing business as Computer Solutions?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Have you alleged that the acts that took place at

10

UDOT were done while you were doing business as Computer

11

Solutions?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

When you had discussions with Pro-Star about trying

14

to resolve this, was there any discussion about them compen-

15

sating you for losses of your contract at UDOT?

16 J

A

I recall bringing that up and it was essentially

17

laughed at.

18

be a joke.

19

contract termination at UDOT and so, you know, therefore,

20

they didn't feel there was any basis for damages, I guess.

21
22

Q

they considered that to

They denied any connection whatsoever to my

You testified that while you were at UDOT that you

were billing your time out at $45 an hour; is that correct?

23
24
25

I mean, it was just —

p

A

That's correct.

Q

And while you were under subcontract at least with

ro-Star you were being paid 26.50 an hour; is that right?
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A

Yes.

Q

Was Pro-Star billing your time out at $45 an hour

under the subcontract?
A

No, they weren't.

Q

Do you know how much they were billing your time

A

To the best of my recollection, it was 38.60 or

for?

something.

It was a very odd amount.

I think it was 38.60.

I've got my calculator still.
Q

Good.

Let's do another calculation.

What is 227

times $38 an hour?
A

38.60.

It comes out to $8,762, $8,762.20.

Q

Did I get that right?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay, and you've previously done the calculation

for 227 times 26.50, sixty-one fifteen fifty.

What's the

difference between those two, Mr. Pratt?
A

$2,646.70.

Q

Twenty-seven forty-six seventy?

A

That's correct.

Q

So if you'd been working for Pro-Star under their

subcontract for those 227 hours, they would have not made
forty-one ninety-nine fifty, they would have made twentyseven forty-six seventy; isn't that right?
A

Under that subcontract, that's right.
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Tab 3

him, how long were those meetings?
A

Oh, anywhere from 15, 20 minutes.

There may have

been one that extended into an hour.
Q

Did the fact that Mr. Pratt had a conflict or that

it had been alleged that he had a conflict with Pro-Star have
anything to do with your decision to terminate Mr. Pratt?
A

Yes.

Q

Would Mr. Pratt's contract have been terminated by

UDOT if there had not been a conflict between him and ProStar?
A

No, the contract would not have been terminated.

Q

Was there some understanding in your mind as to

what Mr. Pratt would have to do in order to get his contract
reinstated at UDOT?
A

Yes.

Q

What was your understanding?

A

Well, it was my understanding that he would have to

work out an agreement with Pro-Star so that there would be no
—

that he would have satisfied all of his obligations with

Pro-Star so that there would be no continuing obligation
there and that he would be a totally free agent then to
contract in his own behalf.
Q

And did you at any time become aware that Mr. Pratt

believed that he'd done everything he could to resolve this
situation?
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Tab 4

A

John Pratt.

Q

And do you think the other one was Ron Hartle?

A

I think the other one was Ron Hartle but I'm not

sure.
Q

Did Will McCoy ever say what happened in that

meeting?
A

After the meeting, Mr. McCoy came out and basically

addressed the individuals that were present, indicating that
Mr. Pratt was going to give up his contract at UDOT and pay
some form of restitution.
Q

But did Mr. McCoy have any particular emotion when

he came out?
A

Was he sad?

Angry?

Happy?

I would say —
MR. OLSON:

Your Honor, I would like a little more

foundation, and I think the question should be rephrased such
that it relates to this individual's observation as opposed
to simply a statement on Mr. McCoy's —
THE COURT:

Well, the question is leading.

objection is sustained.

The

Let's form it in a nonleading

fashion, Counsel.
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Okay.

Did you see Mr. McCoy

express any emotion when he came out from that meeting?
A

In my opinion, he was quite pleased.

He was

smiling, laughing, seemed to be in good spirits.
Q

Did it appear to you that he was happy about the
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briefly on this matter?
THE COURT:

Very well.

(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.)
MR. BROADBENT:

Could we approach the bench for

just a moment?
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.)
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Mr. Crocker, have you now told

us everything that you can remember that Pro-Star or
Mr. McCoy said to you regarding John Pratt?
A

Well, no, not really.

Q

Specifically, and we're not interested in things

that are just office conversation kinds of things, but tell
us anything else that you remember that you haven't told us
about already, any other statement that Mr. McCoy has made
regarding John Pratt and we'll —
A

Okay.

What I have to do is back up in time. Not

knowing at the time who John Pratt was and not having his
name mentioned, a statement at a luncheon by Mr. McCoy and
also backed up by Mr. Basham was that contractors had taken
contracts, consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they
had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star intended to
make an example of them.
Q

Do you remember when that statement was made?
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Tab 5

A

I am not.

We've given it to counsel, but as far as

I know, we don't think it is.

Personally, I don't think it's

in violation.
Q

Do you remember speaking with John Pratt about a

contract violation issue in October of 1989?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

And prior to that time, you hadn't spoken to

Mr. Pratt at all about any possible violation of this contract, had you?
A

I had not.

Q

And you're not aware of anybody else at Pro-Star

that contacted Mr. Pratt about a possible contract violation,
are you?
A

No.

Q

Let's take our Exhibit 40 here, Mr. McCoy, just to

keep these different, we'll use a different color dot, and
let's put some times on this line here.
If I understand the allegations that you're making
in this case, it's that Mr. Pratt violated an employee agreement; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And would you put on this chart a dot that shows

when that competition clause expired, when his duty not to
compete ended?
A

I will.

As a question, is the first of the month
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Q

And when you advised Bill Basham, he indicated that

you were to assure that you looked at the agreements and made
sure there was not a violation of those agreements; isn't
that true?
A

That is true.

Q

And you personally pulled the file in the summer of

1989, didn't you?
A

That is correct.

Q

And you looked at the contracts at that time?

A

Correct.

Q

You looked at both the employee agreement that

we've talked about and the subcontractor agreement?
A

Yes, we did.

Q

Can you fix an exact date?

Could we put a dot on

this chart indicating when you reviewed the contracts or just
a general time frame like this?
A

It was within, I would say, a day, my first sight-

ing of Mr. Pratt, it was basically the same time.
Q

Okay, go ahead then, we'll just put this on the

chart there, as well, in mid summer of 1989.
Now, when you reviewed the employee agreement and
the subcontractor agreement at that time, you reached a
decision as to whether there had been a violation, in your
mind, hadn't you?
A

In my mind, I had, yes.
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Q

And the decision you reached was that there had not

been a violation either of those contracts; isn't that right?
A

That is correct,

Q

And you didn't contact your attorney at that time?

A

I did not.

Q

And the reason you didn't contact your attorney is

because you had concluded that it was so clear there was no
contract violation, you didn't see a need to contact him;
isn't that right?
A

That was based on the conclusion that he had

actually started work in the time frame that I'd seen him at
mid summer of 1989, and that's correct.
Q

And that's what you say is all you know when you

reviewed those contracts was that you just saw him in mid
summer?
A

My assumption was that that was when he started.

Q

Now, you said you became aware of some additional

facts about John Pratt in late September of 1989; is that
correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And this is when you got a letter from Ron Hartle's

attorney?
A

Correct.

Q

And this letter from Ron Hartle's attorney mentions

John Pratt, doesn't it?
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15.

A

It does.

Q

I believe we've referred to this.

This is Exhibit

Is this a copy of the letter that you received from Ron

Hartle's attorney?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

Let me refer you to the second page of this docu-

ment there, the first full paragraph where it says, "There is
a third reason why the noncompetition agreement is not
enforceable.

A subcontractor of your client by the name of

John Pratt was in the same situation as Ron Hartle.
Mr. Pratt's subcontract expired in February 1989.

It had the

same noncompetition provision in it as does Mr. Hartle's
contract.

In April 1989 he entered into a direct contract

with UDOT for computer services," and it goes on and talks
about some other things, and is that the additional information that you say you learned?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

And once you had received that additional informa-

tion, you took some steps at that point then to do some
additional investigation, didn't you?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And what you did is you called the Utah Department

of Transportation and tried to get some documents from them
to show when he'd started work; is that right?
A

That is correct.
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Q

And you told Bill Basham that that's what you were

going to do, that you were going to go to UDOT and obtain
documents to see if they could indicate a possibility of a
contract violation; is that right?
A

I'm not real sure on that. We discussed it at some

time but —
Q

Do you remember discussing it with Bill Basham?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Is that the gist of what —

do you have a different

recollection of what was said?
A

It may have been after I attempted to do that, the

time frame is off, but I did discuss it with him.
Q

And in attempting to get these documents, you

contacted Lorin Sheffield; is that correct?
A

Originally I did ask Lorin to confirm.

Q

And he said he couldn't help you; is that right?

A

That's correct.

Q

And then you contacted Gary Williams in the comp-

troller's office; is that right?
A

Yes, I attempted to contact several other people

prior to that.
Q

And you contacted Harold Worrall also about getting

these documents?
A

I attempted to contact Mr. Worrall first.

Q

And you requested invoices and payment vouchers
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1

from UDOT, didn't you?

2

A

Yes, I did.

3

Q

And following your request, the very next day you

4

got some of those documents; is that correct?

5

A

That is correct.

6

Q

And you did not have to talk to anybody at the

7

Attorney General's Office to get those documents?

8

A

I did not.

9

Q

You didn't have to pay for

10

A

I did not.

H

Q

After getting these documents —

copy

costs?

let me refer you

12

to Exhibit 1. Actually, as I remember your testimony, that

13

probably wasn't —

*4
15

let's look at Exhibit 2 instead.

Was this one of the documents that you got from
UDOT in response to your request?

16

A

Yes, it is.

17

Q

And from this document, did you conclude at that

18

point that there was a contract violation or that there

19

appeared to be —

20
21
22

25

There appeared to be a violation, yes.

Q

And what is it on these documents that you saw that

indicated there was a contract violation, in your mind?

23
24

A

A
r

On both the first page and the second page the

§quest is for consulting services February 27 through

April 30, 1989, $10,215.

Q

And so the difference then is that you claim that

here you didn't know that he was working at UDOT back in this
early March, April time frame, and now you got some documents
that indicated that he was; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And so once you got those documents, that's the

first time that you had any belief that there was a contract
violation; is that your testimony?
A

That is correct.

Q

Do you remember when you got Mr. Hartle —

the

letter from Mr. Hartle's attorney?
A

I received it on September 26th.

Q

Let's have you, Mr. McCoy, take you back to

Exhibit 40, and would you put a green dot as close as we can
get it to September 26th here on this time line?
A

Okay.

Q

Now, when you got these documents, you also learned

of another problem with John Pratt's contract at UDOT, didn't
you?
A

I did not have evidence, but I suspected that there

was something else.
Q

And this additional problem had to do with the fact

that he was paid without a contract being in force; is that
right?
A

I did not know that to be factual at that time, but

140

that was my suspicion.
Q

And once you had that suspicion, you went to

Mr. Sheffield and told him about that suspicion; isn't that
right?
A

What I did —

I'm trying to think —

with

Mr. Sheffield, the first thing I did when I got the letter
was updated him on Mr. Hartle again and advised him that
Mr. Hartle had brought Mr. Pratt in in his response and we
would be looking at that independently and advised him that I
would be talking to his supervisor.
Q

And his supervisor is Kent Nielsen?

A

That is correct.

Q

Or at least, was Kent Nielsen?
And you then did talk to his supervisor about those

same issues?
A

I did.

Q

And did you in the course of this mention that

there was a possible problem with John Pratt's contract not
being in force when he was paid?
A

I don't recall anything specific on the contract

violation with either one of those individuals.
recall specifically.

I know I discussed the —

I just don't
our contract

arrangement and they talked about their concerns and we
talked about what we were going to do, which basically is we
were going to do nothing, we were going to allow them to work
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in the Department.

I do not recall discussing specifically

anything to do with the contract violation.
Q

And when you say contract violation, you're not

talking about the contract violation alleged between you
and —
A

It was the contract in process at UDOT.
MR. BROADBENT:

original deposition?
THE COURT:

Does the Court have Mr. McCoy's

I believe it's in the packet here.
Yes, the original deposition of Will

McCoy taken August 1 of 1990 is in the file with certain
corrections noted on the front, Counsel.

If you're moving to

publish it, your motion is granted.
MR. BROADBENT:
Q

I would move to publish it.

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Mr. McCoy, I direct your

attention to page 42. Are you there on page 42?
A

I am.

Q

Looking at the bottom there's a question that

begins on the bottom of page 42 which I'll read, and then
I'll ask you to read your answer.
"After the question of Mr. Pratt's violation of his
agreement had been raised through this letter which I believe
is the letter from Mr. Hartle's attorney, that you received
from Mr. Hartle's attorney, did you then meet with the people
at UDOT and talk about Mr. Pratt's contractual situation?"
And your answer was?
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A

Okay, would you like me to read —

Q

Yes, please.

A

Okay.

"I did.

I first met with Lorin Sheffield

and told Lorin that Mr. Hartle, our prior discussion of me
bringing him up to date with Mr. Hartle's situation had
included Mr. Pratt in his defense and I assured him again
that we did not want to stop the Department or prohibit them
from getting their work done and we had no desire, you know,
of filing restraining orders against either one.

After that,

I met with Mr. Nielsen and told him the same thing.

I asked

Mr. Nielsen if he had passed on to Mr. Christensen the
situation with Mr. Hartle.

At that point I had not discussed

that at all with Mr. Christensen.

On becoming aware of the

payment with Mr. Pratt, I had some additional concerns that
was —

having been the comptroller and having seen the State

Policy Procurement Board —

having been on the Policy Pro-

curement Board for six years, I could not understand how
Mr, Pratt had contracted with the Department.
fact that he was not on the statewide contract.

I knew for a
I had

installed the controls in the financial system so that kind
of thing couldn't happen."
Q

And you considered the payment of Mr. Pratt without

a contract in force as being a violation of State procurement
Practices; is that correct?
A

That would be correct.
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Q

And you told Mr. Nielsen that you thought UDOT was

exposed politically in violating —

what you considered a

violation of State procurement practices; is that right?
A

Again, I'm not real sure.

In here I say those

words, but I do not indicate that I told him, you know,
looking at my notes at some —

I honestly don't know.

If I

did, I was aware of that, but I don't know whether I told
Mr. Nielsen at that time.
Q

Okay.

After the meeting with Mr. Nielsen, you went

downstairs to see Mr. Christensen, didn't you?
A

I did.

Q

Mr. Christensen was not in; is that right?

A

I was on the way to his office and I did meet him

in the atrium.
Q

Before you met him in the atrium, you ran into

Harold Worrall; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And you told Mr. Worrall that there was a serious

situation regarding payment to Mr. Pratt without a contract
in place that he may want to explore; isn't that right?
A

I did not use those words.

What I told Mr. Worrall

was that in the situation that I had with a couple of contractors, I ran across some information that he should be
aware of, that he should explore, and there was a possibility
that a contract was entered into or services entered into
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before a contract was in place.

I suggested he examine that

himself.
Q

You say you didn't use those exact words?

A

Well, you —

Q

You said that it was a serious situation that he

what was your word in the beginning?

may want to explore.
A

Okay.

I expressed it in the terms I did so —

Q

Mr. Christensen then walked by and Mr. Worrall

stopped him; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And Mr. Worrall was there then, asked that the two

of you meet with Mr. Christensen; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

The next day you did, in fact, meet with

Mr. Christensen, didn't you?
A

I did.

Q

And in your meeting with Mr. Christensen you told

him about John Pratt?
A

I told him about three things.

The first is I went

through the sequence, asked if his staff had brought him up
to date and had discussed with him the Hartle situation, and
I went through the explanation of Mr. Hartle.

I did advise

him that Mr. Hartle had brought Mr. Pratt into his defense,
that we did not intend to do anything with or against the
Department, that we would handle things separately.

I did
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1
2
3

tell him that.
Q

Now, when you started your meeting with

Mr. Christensenr Mr. Worrall hadn't arrived yet, had he?

4

A

That is correct.

5

Q

So you had a discussion with Mr. Christensen, just

6

the two of you; is that correct?

7

A

That is correct.

8

Q

And in the course of that discussion, before

9
10

Mr. Worrall arrived, you told Mr. Christensen about the dates
in John Pratt's contract, didn't you?

11

A

Yes, I did.

12

Q

You also told Mr. Christensen that there was this

13 J contracting problem, that you'd indicated a possible viola14

tion of procurement practices; is that correct?

15

A

That was after Mr. Worrall joined us.

16

Q

And in —

okay, and then when Mr. Worrall joined

17

you, you continued that discussion about this possible

18

violation of procurement practices; is that right?

19
20
21
22
23
24

A

Yes, we did have a brief discussion.

Q

You suggested to Mr. Christensen that they may want

to explore this, didn't you?
A
that —

I don't recall.

I think Mr. Worrall was the one

they were the ones that discussed exploring it at

that point.

I don't recollect exactly what I said then.

25
Q

Let's have you look at your deposition again,

146

Mr. McCoy, on page 58 —

I'm sorry, page 56.

It's a rather

lengthy answer and I don't really want to have you read the
whole thing, so if Counsel doesn't have any objection, I'd
like you just to continue with the paragraph that starts on
line 24 of page 56, and just before you do that, let me ask
you, is this answer, does it relate to this meeting we've
been talking about that you had with Mr. Christensen?
A

It does.

Q

Take a minute if you need to and just read through.

A

It does.

Q

Okay, and so again, reading, if you will,

Mr. McCoy, on line 24, page 56 —
A-

"I explained to him the contracting process and

suggested that's an area that they may want to explore
because I felt that it had been breached.
in as we were talking about the contracts.
expressed great concern on the —

Mr. Worrall came
Mr. Worrall

first of all, he said that

they did not have a contract in place and that payments had
been made against that contract with Mr. Pratt."
Q

Okay, we can stop there.

A

Okay.

Q

You later had another meeting with Mr. Christensen

after this meeting we've been talking about; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And that meeting took place in your office?
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1

A

It did.

2

Q

And Mr. Christensen during that meeting asked for a

3

copy of Mr. Pratt's contract; is that correct?

4 I

A

It was discussed.

I don't recall —

he asked for a

5

copy of the language and I think he asked for a copy of his

6

contract, but I know we did discuss it in some depth.

7

Q

You think he did ask for a copy of his contract?

8

A

I think he did.

9

Q

You told Mr. Christensen that you weren't going to

10

give him copies of John Pratt's contracts; is that right?

11

A

That is correct.

12

Q

You did, however, give him copies of some forms; is

13

that right?

14

I

A

That is correct.

15

Q

Do you recall what forms you gave him?

16

A

I do.

I gave him copies of a standard format for

17

what is called our Type I agreement, that is, an employment

18

agreement for full-time employed, salaried person.

19

nally I thought I had given him a copy of our Type III, which

20

is our subcontract agreement.

21
22
23
24
25

Origi-

During the course of events here, I recalled that
it was actually a Type II contract agreement which is a parttime employee and told him that the language used in the
noncompete was similar or the same as the language used in
the subcontract.

I also told him that Mr. Pratt's contract
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was different, was not exactly the same wording as the
wording that I was giving him,
Q

You then asked Mr, Christensen what he was going to

do about Ron Hartle and John Pratt, didn't you?
A

I did not ask that.

I asked what he was going to

do next.
Q

Let's have you look on page 59 of your deposition.

A

Okay.

Q

Again, there is a fairly lengthy answer and I don't

want you to have to read the entire thing.

Is this answer,

does it relate to this meeting that we've been talking about
with you and Mr. Christensen?
A

It does.

Q

Would you begin, just read the last paragraph of

your answer that begins on line 11 on page 59?
A

Okay.

The one that starts, "So they were not

identical"?
Q

Yes.

A

"So they were not identical, but it was the type of

agreement that we signed with all of our people without
exception.

I asked him at that time, I tried to get an idea

where he was at and what he was going to do, and his comment
was that they were still researching it and analyzing it and
he wasn't at liberty to discuss any more."
Q

When you say you tried to get an idea of where he
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was at and what he was going to do, that has reference to
what he was going to do about the John Pratt and Ron Hartle
situation; isn't that right?
A

It was that, the contracting situation, yes.

Q

You then had another contact with Mr. Christensen

of UDOT on the following Monday, October 2nd; is that
correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And Mr. Christensen called you and reported what

he'd done about Ron Hartle and John Pratt; is that correct?
A

Mr. Christensen called several times. We played

telephone tag.

When we finally did talk, he asked if I could

come in and talk.

He advised me what he had done with

Mr. Hartle and Mr. Pratt and advised me that our contracts
would also cease.
Q

Mr. McCoy, John Pratt gave written notice of

terminating his subcontract agreement, didn't he?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

And the notice was given on or about February 27th;

is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And so his subcontract terminated 30 days later, on

or about March 29th of 1989; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And so he had a noncompete agreement in the
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A

Would you restate your question?

about the time frame because
Q

Okay.

I'm concerned

—

At no time have you ever told anyone at UDOT

that Mr. Pratt's contract, his noncompetition obligation to
Pro-Star had lapsed when they terminated him; is that
correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Now, when you found out about Mr. Pratt, you had

already had some discussions with people at UDOT about
Mr. Hartle; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And after you found out about Mr. Pratt, you

basically talked about Mr. Pratt and Mr. Hartle together when
you talked to people at UDOT; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

The time period was very, very

short.
Q

As your attorney said yesterday, you basically

dealt with him as a package; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And all of your relationships and conversations

with UDOT in this time frame we've been talking about, and,
in fact, since January of 1989, have been on behalf of ProStar; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Let me refer you now to Exhibit 30 to begin with.
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it with out attorney

and that

we were concerned

with

the

no

compete issue being consistent and that he could call the
attorney.
number.

I gave him Eric's name, the company and telephone

Mr. Pratt left and that's the last contact I really

had, other than just the physical view."
Q

On October 2nd, 1989, the date that Mr. Pratt's

contract at UDOT was terminated, some of your staff were also
terminated by UDOT, weren't they?
A

I was informed that they would be terminated that

same day.
Q

In fact, they were actually terminated, weren't

they?
A

They were told that they would be terminated the

day I contacted DOT, the following day, and they continued
work.
Q

You immediately contacted Mr. Christensen at UDOT,

didn't you?
A

I called Mr. Harold Worrall first.

I tried —

attempted Mr. Christensen and he had gone home for the day.
Q

And the next day you contacted Mr. Christensen?

A

I did.

Q

And your staff was then allowed back into UDOT that

next day?
A

Our agreement, when Mr. Christensen called me into

his office the 2nd of October, the commitment was that our
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people would be terminated in the shortest period of time
possible and he asked me to work with our people and with his
staff to come to a logical conclusion as rapidly as possible
in either phase or task and our people would no longer work
there.
Q

In any event, you didn't have to resolve anything

with Mr. Pratt before you could get your people back into
UDOT, did you?
A

I did not.

Q

When you joined UDOT in 1980, Mr. Findlay was

comptroller at UDOT; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Is that when you met Mr. Findlay?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

And you first met —

A

I'm sorry, I take it back.

I met him about six

months to a year earlier than that when I was with the U.S.
Department of Transportation for some period of time.
Q

And you worked under Mr. Findlay when you first

joined the Utah Department of Transportation, didn't you?
A

I did not.

Q

Who did you work under?

A

I worked in a dual reporting responsibility to the

director, Mr. Bill Hurley, and to the Utah Transportation
Commission.
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bitter, he had some negative words about our company, and I
asked our employees that it would be best if they stayed away
from him because his attitude was not the best and I told
them that he did not care for Pro-Star.
Q

You're not aware of anything bad that John Pratt's

done or that you would consider bad, are you?
A

I'm not.

Q

You never told anybody that John Pratt's done

anything bad, have you?
A

No, I have not.
MR. BROADBENT:

Your Honor, we move to admit

Exhibits 30 through 32.
THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. OLSON:

None, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Very well, they're received.

MR. BROADBENT:
THE COURT:

No further questions.

Before you start your cross-

examination, if you intend to proceed in that fashion — I
presume you do.
MR. OLSON:

Just a few clarifying questions.

THE COURT:

We'll take a brief recess.

Members of

the jury, remember the admonition I've given you.
Court will take a 10-minute recess.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

Jury, parties and counsel are present.
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THE COURT:

Objection as to foundation is

sustained.
MR. BROADBENT:

Could we approach the bench, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Well, Counsel, let's not make too much

of a habit of this.

My reason for sustaining the objection

is that we don't have any basis at this point to know when
any conversation occurred that would lead us to conclude that
it's relevant, so let's have further foundation as to when
the conversation that's going to be testified to occurred.
Q

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Okay.

When did the conversa-

tion take place, Mr. Clawson?
A

Probably in late February, early March.

Q

Okay, and tell us what Mr. McCoy said in that

conversation.
MR. OLSON:
relevance in time.

Your Honor, I again object as to
It's six months before the events that

are at issue in this case.
THE COURT:

Well, we're talking about February or

March of 1989, at the time this witness was employed at ProStar?
MR. BROADBENT:
THE COURT:
the objection.

That's correct.

Well, Counsel, I'm going to overrule

You may testify.

THE WITNESS:

We were on our way to one of the
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clients in the state and the subject of John Pratt came up
and the gist of the conversation was that Will was unhappy
with John Pratt's conduct of terminating his contract and
going to work directly for a client.

He felt —

his comments

were the frame that it was unethical and he was quite unhappy
with John.
Q

From being at Pro-Star in this two-month period,

did you know where John Pratt was working before he terminated with Pro-Star?
A

It was up at an office there on Social Hall Avenue.

I believe it was the Department of Transportation or —

I'm

not sure just what department at the time.
Q

So you're not sure what department, but Mr. McCoy

was upset because he thought that John Pratt had done something wrong?
A

Yes.
THE COURT:

Counsel, there's no reason to restate

the answer of a witness.
MR. BROADBENT:

He's your witness.
I have no further questions, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right, you may cross-examine.

MR. BROADBENT:

Excuse me.

Before we do that, I'd

like to ask the witness to, if you would, place on this time
line —

we'll use yellow —

the time frame in which this

conversation with Mr. McCoy took place.
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exception.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Broadbent)

Did you later have any other

conversations with Will McCoy in which John Pratt was
mentioned?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

When was the next conversation that you remember

having with him?
A

I believe it was on May 3rd, 1989.

Q

And what did Mr. McCoy say on that occasion about

John Pratt?
A

He was telling me that he believed that I should

not have any dealings with Mr. Pratt because he believed that
he was a bad influence on me.
Q

Did he say anything else?

A

He said that he had done several things that were

professional unethical and that he —

he said that he could

not elaborate, but he said that he had done things that were
far worse than anything I knew about.
Q

Did you know about anything unethical that

Mr. Pratt had done?
A

The only thing that I had known about that could

even be construed in my mind as touching upon a lack of
ethics was his transition from being a Pro-Star employee to a
subcontractor.
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both of them; isn't that right?
A

Yes, he was —

he had been working overtime for

Employment Security so he would have a reserve fund of time
that could be used so that he could be satisfying both
clients.
Q

And when he left Employment Security, he left

things in a lurch there, did he not?
A

No, he did not.

Q

So it didn't make any difference that the leader of

Pro-Star's team at Employment Security was withdrawing from
the project?
A

No, it did not.

Q

Worked just fine for you?

A

Yes.

Q

And Pro-Star never was concerned about that?

A

Mr. McCoy never expressed any concern that

Mr. Pratt had pulled out of Employment Security at the time
that he did.
Q

He didn't express any concern to me.

Now, when Mr. Pratt or Mr. McCoy spoke with you in

mid April of 1989 and asked you where John Pratt was working,
at that time was it your understanding when he asked you that
question, that he didn't know where John Pratt was working?
A

It was.

Q

Okay.

A

He had

~
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Q

Anything else that you remember from reading that?

A

That is the point of this page.

Q

Would you continue, if you would, down through your

answer through line 15 on page 33, Mr. Christensen?

Just

read through that.
Does that further refresh your recollection about
anything

—

A

Yeah.

Q

—

that happened?

Tell us now what you remember.
A

Well, Mr. McCoy stated that he didn't want a

lawsuit with UDOT and UDOT didn't want to dirty their name up
and they were just going to have a business arrangement to
clear up the matter.
Q

Okay.

Now, you'd mentioned previously that you

were out at the Utah Department of Transportation.
A

Correct.

Q

And how long were you there?

A

Off and on for about three weeks.

Q

In what time frame?

A

September, I believe.

I came back off my vacation

September 1st or 2nd, I think, so it would be about September
5th.
Q

Okay, and what were you working on when you were

working out at UDOT?
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circumstances was and I told him the same thing.
Shortly after that, or I think it was the same
telephone conversation, I got a call —

I talked to Bill

Basham who is the owner of Pro-Star/Prodata and at that time
he indicated that he would take whatever means he could to
get me out of UDOT.
Q

Now, after you stopped doing subcontract work for

Pro-Star, did you continue then doing computer consulting
work?
A

Yes, I did at UDOT.

Q

And did you have an arrangement or a contract with

A

Yes.

Q

Did you have a contract with them?

A

Yes.

Q

And following this discussion that you just testi-

UDOT?

fied about with Mr. McCoy and Mr. Basham on the telephone,
was your contract with UDOT terminated?
A

Shortly thereafter, yes.

There were some things

that happened in the meantime, though, because I had interaction and had interaction all along with my attorney concerning the legality of what I was doing and I was assured
that it was perfectly legal.
Q

When was your contract at UDOT terminated?

A

On October 2nd, 1989.
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Q

And as I recall, you've been in business both with

him and with Bill Basham, who was now the president of
Prodata; is that correct?
A

I was not a partner in that business•

I was just

an employee as they were.
Q

But you were all in that business together?

A

That's right.

Q

That was a consulting business; is that correct?

A

That's right.

Q

Mr. Worrall, I direct your attention now back to

Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 that you've testified about, and you've
indicated that this memo was prepared by you?
A

That's right, myself and Gary Williams, chief

accountant.
Q

And it was prepared based upon your investigation

of certain facts?
A

That's correct.

Q

Did anyone request that you prepare this memo?

A

Yes.

Well, no, not the memo, but requested me to

go back and look at the documents, as I indicated earlier.
Q

And that was Neal Christensen that requested that?

A

No, that was Will McCoy.

Q

So Will McCoy requested that you go and look at

some documents, and as a result of that request, you did an
investigation and prepared this memo which is Plaintiff's
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Exhibit 6?
A

That's correct•

Q

I direct your attention for a moment to paragraph 2

of this exhibit.

Would you read that paragraph to the jury,

please?
A

"An existing contract between UDOT and Pro-Star was

amended upward for an additional $72,000 and extended from
1-1-89 through 9-1-89.

This was for ISS DP chargeback work,

according to back-up contract documentation."
Q

Wasn't there, in fact, an additional contract

between UDOT and Pro-Star in effect at this time?
A

Apparently there was, according to this.

Q

And wasn't Pro-Star being paid under that other

contract, as well as the one that you reference here that's
been extended through September 1, 1989?
A

You mean another contract other than mentioned here

in this memo?
Q

Yes.

A

There was another contract with Pro-Star.

I'm not

sure what services it was for, though, I mean, what specific
system.
Q

As you sit here today, do you have a recollection

whether that other contract had expired as of the date of
this memo?
A

I don't.
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Q

Do you have a recollection as to whether Pro-Star

was being paid under the other contract as of the date of
this memo?
A

Which was September f89.

I don't know whether that

contract ran out June 30th or not.
Q

You have previously read to the jury paragraph 3

of this memo.

Would you take just a moment and look at that

again?
A

Yes.

Q

The information that's in paragraph 3 didn't come

from any documents that are on file at UDOT, did it?
A

No.

Q

In fact, the comptroller's office doesn't keep any

documents that would give you that information, does it?
A

That's correct.

Q

That information, in fact, came from Mr. McCoy;

isn't that correct?
A

I would think so.

I don't recall exactly where we

got that, but I'm sure that's probably the case.
Q

And you never reviewed any documents provided to

you by Mr. McCoy in making those statements in paragraph 3?
A

No.

Q

And you never talked to John Pratt about any of the

information in that paragraph before writing this memo?
A

I did not, no.
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Q

Did anyone under your direction talk to Mr. Pratt

before preparing this memo?
A

I'm not aware of it if they did.

Q

So in fact, you had really no way of knowing

whether the statements in paragraph 3 of this memo were true,
did you?
A

I didn't at that time.

Q

Looking now to paragraph 6 of this memo, you've

previously read a portion of that paragraph and I won't have
you read that again, but I'll direct your attention to the
same place there beginning with the third sentence in paragraph 6.
A

Which begins?

Q

With, "John Pratt was employed with Pro-Star."

A

In paragraph 6?

Q

Yes.

the fourth.

Do you see that?

It's the third or probably

Maybe I'm missing a sentence.

A

Okay.

Q

Do you see the sentence that says, "John Pratt was

employed with Pro-Star for a partial period"?
A

Yes.

Q

And that sentence, likewise, you had no documents

that would indicate that that was the case, did you?
A

That's probably true.

Q

You never saw an employment contract between John
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Pratt and Pro-Star, did you?
A

Not at that time, no.

Q

You never talked to John Pratt about his employment

with Pro-Star?
A

No.

Q

So the only place you could have got this informa-

tion would have been from Mr. McCoy; is that true?
A

That, and I also had the assumption working in that

business, the understanding that you have various noncompete
clauses with various companies when you're under contract
with them.

You understand that situation and assume that to

be the case.
Q

Kind of standard.

Now, this sentence —

and maybe I'm not reading it

the same way you intended it, but this sentence, as I understand it, doesn't refer to any noncompete provision, and you
correct me if I'm wrong.

Doesn't this sentence say that John

Pratt was employed during the same period of time that he was
rendering services for UDOT, that he was employed by Pro-Star
during that same period of time?
A

Partial period, right.

Q

So that's not referring to a noncompete clause, is

A

I'm not sure whether it would or not.

it?
Depends on

whether he was a subcontractor or whether he was an employee
or what their arrangements were.
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Q

And that's not spelled out here in this paragraph

anywhere?
A

No.

Q

Or anywhere else in the memo?

A

No.

My major concern was with the contractual

arrangements and the payments that we made as Utah Department
of Transportation, not John Pratt or Ron Hartle or Prodata,
for that matter.
Q

And so you really had no way of knowing whether

this statement about John Pratt's employment in paragraph 6
was true, did you?
A

That's true, probably true.

Q

And this memo was provided to Mr. Findlay?

A

That's correct.

Q

And it was provided so that he could then use this

information to make some decision about this matter; is that
correct?
A

The major thing that I had a responsibility to do

was to point out the facts of the contractual arrangements
and the payment to the executive director of the Department
for his action.

Once I became aware of this, had I not acted

and an auditor came along behind and found this sort of
contractual arrangement going and this sort of payment
process going on, I'd be in severe difficulties with the
statutory authority as comptroller.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

To prove intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendants made a false statement about

a presently existing fact.
2.
false,

or

That

the

recklessly

defendants
made

the

knew

the

statement

statement

without

to be

sufficient

knowledge.
3.

That the defendants intended to induce the Utah

Department of Transportation to act in reliance on the false
statement.
4.

That the Utah Department of Transportation did in

fact act with justification on the false statement.
Intentional misrepresentation is never presumed.

It is a

wrong of such a nature that merely speculative evidence or even
the simple preponderance of evidence already discussed will not
suffice.

Each element of intentional misrepresentation must be

proven by evidence that is clear and convincing.

Such proof

makes the existence of a fact not just more probable than not,
but highly probable.
and

undubitable,

substantial doubt.

Clear and convincing evidence is precise

unmistakable

and

free

from

serious

or

It carries with it not only the power to

persuade the mind as to the truth or probable correctness of
the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page Two

^°

in the mind such truth or correctness.

Clear and convincing

evidence of intentional misrepresentation instantly tilts the
scales in the affirmative, when weighed against the evidence in
opposition, and, your minds as finders of the facts are left
with an abiding conviction that the charges as to each element

of

V&4f&2!im
If the plaintiff fails to establish by clear and convincing

evidence any one of these facts, then you must find that there
was no intentional misrepresentation.

INSTRUCTION NO,

The actionable false statement must relate to a presently
existing fact.
cannot

serve

The mere expression of a judgment or an opinion
as

the

misrepresentation.
this

element

convincing

of

basis

for

a

finding

of

intentional

The plaintiff has the burden of proving
intentional

evidence.

If you

misrepresentation

by

clear

and

find that the defendants only

stated their honest opinion or judgment to the Utah Department
of Transportation,

then

the

plaintiff

actionable intentional misrepresentation.

has

failed

to

prove

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

The false statement must be made with knowledge of or
reckless disregard for its falsity.

If you find that the

defendants had no knowledge of the falsity of any statement made
to the Utah Department of Transportation and did not act with
reckless disregard for the truth of such statement, then the
plaintiff has failed to prove an intentional misrepresentation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

X

The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendants intended to induce the Utah
Department of Transportation to act in reliance on their false
statement.

In other words, the defendants, in communicating

with UDOT, must have intended to cause UDOT to rely on the
allegedly false statement.

If you find that the plaintiff has

not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
acted with such an intent, then the plaintiff has failed to
prove intentional misrepresentation.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The
evidence

plaintiff

that

Transportation
justifiable.

any
on

must

reliance
the

prove

by

clear

of

the

Utah

false

information

and

convincing

Department
was

actual

of
and

Proof that UDOT made an independent investigation,

unhindered by the defendants, regarding those facts allegedly
misrepresented by the defendants contradicts the fact proposition
that

UDOT

actually

relied

upon

the

defendants'

statements.

Further, where the means to discover the truth of an alleged
misstatement lies in the hands of the person allegedly deceived
and ordinary prudence would have uncovered the truth, reliance is
not justifiable.

If you find that any alleged reliance was not

actual and justifiable, then the plaintiff has failed to prove an
intentional misrepresentation.

